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Constitutions and Bills of Rights: Invigorating or 
Placating Democracy? 
Champions of constitutions and bills of rights regularly portray them as possessing 
significant, sometimes mysterious, powers. One characterisation is that newly 
implemented constitutions may invigorate a democracy, particularly at the ballot box. 
This article challenges that notion by scrutinising a relatively unexplored area of 
constitutional performance: voter turnout. In particular, it examines a number of 
jurisdictions that have recently implemented constitutions and bill of rights, finding that 
in many of them, voter turnout decreased after passage, sometimes significantly. As the 
argument for a codified British constitution endures, the findings of this paper provide 
provisional evidence that those advocating for such a device should be wary of touting 
its potentially invigorating democratic effects. Ultimately, however, the article calls for 
more research into the area of constitutions and democratic performance, such as voter 
turnout.  
INTRODUCTION 
The present 'unwritten constitution' is an anachronism riddled with references 
to our ancient past, unsuited to the social and political democracy of the 21st 
century and future aspirations of its people. It fails to give primacy to the 
sovereignty of the people and discourages popular participation in the political 
process.1 
Written constitutions have played a significant—if not a pre-eminent—role in the 
establishment of democracy and the continuation of democratic rights and 
principles…or so the story goes. And the United Kingdom, with its unwritten 
constitution, historic monarchy and ‘untenable’ principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty,2 is the perfect example of a nation stuck in the past, unable to transform 
1 Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta (10 July 2014), HC 
Paper No.463, 19 (my emphasis).  
2 Ibid, p 21. 
1
 itself into the contemporary conception of a truly democratic nation-state, complete 
with the primary symbol (ie, a written constitution) that virtually all such states now 
possess. Well, there may in fact be good reason for not doing so. 
If anything was ever in vogue in democratic and constitutional theory, constitutions 
would surely be it; at no point in history have the countries of the world had so many 
constitutions in place. 3  Ever since the drafting of the US Constitution in 1789 
democracies—and even non-democracies,4 for that matter—have increasingly felt the 
need to pen a written Constitution, even if only in symbolic form. Much of this 
constitutional desire has come within the last half-century, or post-war era. 5  But 
political philosophy has long held that such documents are ‘antecedent to government’,6 
and many in legal philosophy note that constitutions are essential to the rule of law and 
the protection of basic human rights.7 Some have gone so far as to say that the idea of 
a contemporary founding or ‘fundamental [political] transformation’ not incorporating 
a written constitution would be ‘unthinkable’; and in the current climate, they are 
probably right.8 Nevertheless, without such a document in place, the UK contains a 
well-established rule of law, protection of human rights, and—even after the Brexit 
referendum and more constitutional change in Britain—a functioning government. 
Given these circumstances, one may ask why calls frequently arise for Britain to draft 
a codified constitution. Here the answer is straightforward: because the desire for 
constitutional change is a time-honoured democratic tradition.9  
But would a written constitution persuade citizens to get more involved in the 
political process, as the Commons report quoted above asserts? Before a more detailed 
assessment can take place, however, the statement needs to be further scrutinised. It 
notes that the current constitution is ‘riddled with references to our ancient past’, which 
is portrayed as negative. But, it is unclear why these references should be viewed in 
such a manner. Would a written Constitution not explicitly mention Magna Carta, the 
Bill of Rights 1689 or the Acts of Union 1707? The 1958 French Constitution, for 
                                                        
3 M Loughlin, ‘The Constitutional Imagination’ (2015) 78(1) Modern Law Review 1, 2. 
4 See The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, established in 1982.  
5 DJ Galligan and M Versteeg, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political Foundations of 
Constitutions’ in DJ Galligan and M Versteeg, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions (2013) 
p 3. 
6 As Thomas Paine famously wrote (cited in M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p 46). 
7 See, eg, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) p 
133; TRS Allan, ‘The Rule of Law’, in D Dyzenhaus and M Thorburn, Philosophical Foundations of 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p 216 (although Allan does not 
necessarily subscribe to this view…he merely acknowledges it is a common ‘assumption’).  
8 Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) p 16.  
9 N Barber, ‘Against a Written Constitution’ (2008) Public Law 11 (“No one enjoys radical change 
quite as much as constitutional lawyers”). 
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 instance, explicitly mentions the Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789.10 Additionally, 
an argument can be made that such historical contextual acknowledgement is the most 
important—and indeed, the most celebrated—part of the USA’s antiquated 
Constitution.11 Thus a criticism such as this seems unwarranted, or entirely misplaced. 
Further, the clause ‘unsuited to the…future aspirations of its people’ also connects to 
the discouragement of ‘popular participation in the political process’. As is evidenced 
below, declarations of aspirations and ambitions—which are often present in preambles 
and bills of rights—often have been associated with ‘invigorating’ or ‘inspiring’ the 
populace. A further invigoration method is constitutional acknowledgement that ‘the 
people’ are sovereign. The current UK constitution does not guarantee this, and such a 
sovereignty ‘failing’ appears to be an especially significant factor in discouraging 
political participation. Taken altogether, the complementary statements imply that if 
the United Kingdom had a ‘modern’ constitution that included state aspirations and 
which provided ultimate sovereignty to the people, then popular participation in the 
democratic process would be encouraged. This is a bold, and unsubstantiated, claim.  
This article questions whether constitutions and bills of rights are indeed the 
invigorating, democracy-reinforcing mechanisms they are frequently portrayed as. 
Although such esteemed democratic ‘necessities’ provide citizens with a national 
symbol, the entrenchment of rights and perhaps a minimal understanding of 
governmental relationships, this piece argues that they do not ‘invigorate’ polities in the 
manner that constitutional theorists and others have suggested. It is primarily concerned 
with one main issue regarding such revered texts: whether new constitutions and bills 
of rights (including major constitutional amendments) serve to invigorate democracies, 
thus leading to higher democratic participation (ie, higher voting levels). After all, if 
the claims that constitutions and bills of rights are inspiring, value-laden, and 
aspirational documents capable of empowering citizens with ultimate sovereignty, then 
it is fitting to connect such claims with democratic performance. It is certainly 
acknowledged, however, that democratic participation—especially today—goes 
beyond voting, and can manifest in social movements, public consultations, or digital 
engagement (eg, e-petitions), among other things. Arguments could be put forward that 
some of these developments may be more important than voting, and could have more 
of an impact on a state’s constitutional politics. Nevertheless, the connection between 
constitutions, bills of rights, and voting is important, and requires further investigation. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, the connection between constitutions, bills of 
rights, and democracy is discussed, and evidence is presented that scholars have 
connected such documents not only to a healthy political system and increased 
                                                        
10 French Constitution, Preamble, para. 1.  
11 See, eg, T Ginsburg and AZ Huq, ‘Assessing Constitutional Performance’, in T Ginsburg and AZ 
Huq, Assessing Constitutional Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) pp 23-26.  
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 democratic participation, but also to ‘inspiring’ or invigorating the populous. The 
following section discusses the practical aspects surrounding constitutions and voter 
turnout, stressing that measuring this relationship is an inherently difficult process. It 
also further justifies why the relationship is important, and should be studied within the 
UK and elsewhere. The Methods section provides the hypotheses and explains how the 
empirical analysis was conducted. The following three sections primarily use case 
studies, in addition to supporting empirical evidence, to demonstrate the effects of 
implementing constitutions, bills of rights, and constitutional amendments on voter 
turnout. The final section discusses some of the implications of this provisional study, 
and calls for more research into this area of constitutional assessment. It concludes by 
noting that although constitutions and bills of rights often appear to be democracy-
reinforcing mechanisms, ultimately—and surprisingly in some cases—they could also 
contain democracy-hindering downsides. 
 
1. CONSTITUTIONS, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 
Constitutions are essentially the ‘Dummy’s Guide’ to understanding state operation: 
they may reveal some essential features, but one will hardly understand state processes 
through consulting them. Nevertheless, they are widely considered the first port of call 
for comparative legal scholars and are said to contain the fundamental law essential to 
the establishment and operation of states. Constitutional theorists have laid out a 
number of functions that constitutions serve, including: setting forth constitutional 
values, entrenching constitutional rights, conferring and limiting powers of government, 
delineating the structure and operations of the state12  and even generating endless 
democratic debate.13 These functions have been extensively written about and indeed 
are endlessly debated. And yet, constitutions would be relatively dull devices if they 
possessed only legal significance. 
Although debate over constitutional success or failure has been a long-running 
strand of academic investigation, only recently has ‘constitutional performance’ 
become a more sophisticated sub-topic of constitutional theory. Recent texts have 
analysed why national constitutions endure,14 what constitutions should do,15 and how 
                                                        
12 See, eg, A Barak, ‘On Constitutional Implications and Constitutional Structure’, in D Dyzenhaus and 
M Thorburn, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016) 62-64; BC Jones, ‘Preliminary Warnings on Constitutional Idolatry’ (2016) Public Law 74, 75.   
13 S Levinson, ‘Do Constitutions Have a Point?’, in EF Paul, FD Miller and J Paul, What Should 
Constitutions Do? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p 178. 
14 Z Elkins, T Ginsburg and B Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
15 Paul, Miller and Paul, above n 13. 
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 constitutions should be assessed.16 This important development has led not only to a 
more robust discussion regarding constitutional success, but also to a more widespread 
empirical analysis of constitutions more generally, including how long they last, which 
types of rights are provided for, and what specific factors we should take into 
consideration (eg, levels of democracy, political stability, economic performance, or 
crisis propensity).17 Much recent scholarship has strayed beyond traditional doctrinal 
and philosophical approaches to explore the social and political elements of 
constitutions. 18  After all, ‘one cannot understand constitutions simply from the 
perspective of settlement’ alone. 19  These perspectives extend into the field of 
constitutional possibility; and what an alluring space it is. Here scholars have gone 
beyond constitution as symbol 20  concluding that modern constitutional texts are 
‘performative’, in the sense that ‘they perform an action, rather than only describe an 
event or make a statement’.21 Loughlin recently noted this, emphasising ‘the manner in 
which constitutions can harness the power of narrative, symbol, ritual and myth to 
project an account of political existence in ways that shape – and re-shape – political 
reality’.22 Although some may challenge the statistical evaluation of constitutional 
success,23 this article aligns with and expands on the empirical aspects of constitutional 
performance, proving a novel inquiry into the relationship between new constitutions, 
bills of rights, and constitutional amendments with voter turnout.  
This renewed focus on constitutional performance has on many occasions touched 
on or insinuated a relationship between constitutions and voter turnout, although these 
efforts have not done so as directly as this article does. Dixon and Landau state that ‘[a] 
central function of a written constitution is to enhance the stability of the political 
system’, and that a competitive democracy requires this ‘minimum core of a democratic 
constitution’ to endure if a constitution is to be successful, emphasising the democratic 
vote.24 Hardin also argues that constitutions can (or should) provide for the successful 
coordination of society and politics.25 Ginsburg and Huq take these arguments further, 
stressing that ‘in democratic contexts, [constitutions] can also help facilitate 
participatory politics’, and that ‘[f]idelity to the constitution provides a normative 
                                                        
16 Ginsburg and Huq, above n 11. 
17 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, above n 14, pp 12-35. 
18 Of course, some of these social and political elements have always been present in constitutional 
scholarship, and can be seen in work by Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Jefferson, and others.  
19 Levinson, ‘Do Constitutions have a Point’ (n 10), 178.  
20 See, eg, M Lerner, ‘Constitution and Court as Symbols’ (1937) 46(8) Yale Law Journal 1290; TC 
Grey, ‘The Constitution as Scripture’ (1984) 37(1) Stanford Law Review 1. 
21 J Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (Abington: Birbeck Law, 2008) p 5. 
22 Loughlin, above n 3, p 3. 
23 See, eg, Roberto Gargarella, ‘When is a constitution doing well? The Alberdian test in the Americas’, 
in Ginsburg and Huq, above n 11, p 99.  
24 R Dixon and D Landau, ‘Competitive democracy and the constitutional minimum core’, in Ginsburg 
and Huq, above n 11, p 268.   
25 R Hardin, ‘Why a Constitution’, in Galligan and Versteeg, above n 5, p 51. 
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 justification for democratic participation’.26 These statements appear similar to the 
Commons Committee statement at the beginning of this article.  
Claims regarding additional ‘constitutional possibilities’ can make such texts appear 
powerfully tempting: Blackburn has claimed that such a document may ‘bring 
government and the governed closer together’, 27  and could ‘strengthen public 
confidence and trust in the political system’ by better educating citizens.28 Given that 
modern constitutions are cloaked in values and aspirations, King maintains that 
constitutions can be viewed as ‘mission statements’. 29  Recent focus on including 
citizens in the drafting process has demonstrated a number of benefits, such as 
decreased state violence,30 stronger citizen constitutional attachment,31 even a longer 
constitutional lifespan.32 Further, the narrative component, which may incorporate a 
nation’s history, can sometimes act as ‘a source of inspiration’ for citizens. 33 
Landemore notes that great constitutions include such ‘inspirational’ features, including 
that they are ‘beautifully written and likely to generate emotions such as love and 
admiration among its own people and beyond, among current and future generations’.34 
Ultimately, the notion that there may be something ‘sacred or irrational’ in the very 
‘nature of constitutions’35 is a long-held belief that much constitutional scholarship has 
perpetuated.36  
A popular performative mechanism located within constitutions is preambles, which 
as an expressive component can ‘narrate the nation's past and envision its future’.37 
King has noted that such devices can provide ‘normative guidance and the institutional 
declaration of key variables’,38 while Levinson states that they express ‘the ostensible 
“essence” of the people or nation’, and on occasion can be ‘inspiring’.39 Even though 
                                                        
26 T Ginsburg ad AZ Huq, ‘Assessing Constitutional Performance’ in Ginsburg and Huq, above n 11, p 
16.  
27 R Blackburn, “Britain’s unwritten constitution”, British Library, available at 
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution (accessed 20 October 2017).  
28 R Blackburn, “Enacting a Written Constitution for the United Kingdom” (2015) 36(1) Statute Law 
Review 1, 5. 
29 J King, ‘Constitutions as Mission Statements’, in Galligan and Versteeg, above n 5, p 73.   
30 J Widner, ‘Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview’ (2008) 49 William and Mary 
Law Review 1513.  
31 DC Moehler, Distrusting democrats: Outcomes of participatory constitution-making (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2008).  
32 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, above n 14.  
33 Galligan and Versteeg, above n 5, p 9.  
34 Hélène Landemore, ‘What is a good constitution? Assessing the constitutional proposal in the 
Icelandic experiment’, in Ginsburg and Huq, above n 11, p 79. 
35 Galligan and Versteeg, above n 5, p 42. 
36 Mila Versteeg, ‘“Perfection in Imperfection”: Joseph de Maistre and the Limitations of Constitutional 
Design’, in Constitutions and the Classics: Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to 
Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp 323-325.  
37 M Versteeg, ‘Unpopular Constitutionalism’ (2014) 89 Indiana Law Journal 1133, 1140.  
38 King, above n 29, p 82. 
39 Levinson, above n 13, pp 177-78.  
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 the ‘justiciability’ of preambles within states remains relatively low, it is the expressive 
elements of these intriguing devices that scholars—and indeed many countries—have 
found so empowering, and therefore so useful. By incorporating narrative, history, 
values and aspirations, preambles are the primary places by which constitutions can 
‘offer alternative perceptions of reality’. 40  Thus if constitutions can—or have the 
potential to—inspire people, strengthen public confidence, capture the ‘essence’ of a 
citizenry, and even be looked at as sacred, then their importance goes well beyond legal 
significance. Indeed, under certain conditions their political significance may rival or 
even supersede their legal significance.   
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, contemporary ‘we the people’ 
democratic constitutions—at least in theory—provide sovereignty to the citizens (ie, 
‘popular sovereignty’).41 It is this focus on sovereignty, as opposed to democracy, that 
is ‘the language of constitutions’.42  Although the constitutional reality under such 
claims varies,43 the ‘we the people’ refrain often gives the impression that—even within 
representative democracies with strong judicial review—it is the people who are central 
to establishing government; it is the people who provide governmental legitimacy; and 
it is the people who ultimately hold state power. Indeed the rise of popular sovereignty 
and democratic constitutions throughout the years has been an international force, and 
such language now adorns a plethora of constitutions throughout the world.44 Bold 
claims regarding this ‘we the people’ factor have also been made, especially in relation 
to the foundational elements and the composition of the state’s narrative. Lerner 
recognises the foundational function as the second major role of constitutions, 
observing that they ‘provide the citizenry with a sense of ownership and authorship, a 
sense that “We the people” includes me’.45 These words echo those from Ackerman’s 
definitive work on the subject, where he noted that, ‘the narrative we tell ourselves 
about our Constitution’s roots is a deeply significant act of collective self-definition; its 
continual re-telling plays a critical role in the ongoing construction of national 
identity’.46 He further emphasises that, ‘[t]o discover the Constitution is to discover and 
important part of oneself’.47  
This ‘we the people’ feature, perhaps more than any other constitutional 
characteristic, is important in understanding the connection between constitutions and 
voting—after all, the Commons report explicitly connected the failure to ‘give primacy 
                                                        
40 Loughlin, above n 3, p 3. 
41 B Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism’ (1997) Virginia Law Review 771.  
42 DJ Galligan, ‘The Sovereignty Deficit of Modern Constitutions’ (2013) 33(4) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 703, 704. The author rightly points out that ‘democracy’ is rarely mentioned.  
43 Ibid, pp 729-30. 
44 Ibid, p 707. 
45 Lerner, above n 8, at 18.  
46 B Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p 36.  
47 Ibid, p 37. 
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 to the sovereignty of the people’ and the discouragement of participation in the political 
process. Indeed, in the vast majority of ‘we the people’ constitutions the most 
significant power citizens hold remains at the ballot box (during local and national 
elections, at referendums, etc.), where the people can have their most significant 
influence: voting for candidates, laws or initiatives that will either preserve the status 
quo or bring about desired change. Rarely do ‘we the people’ constitutions provide an 
all-encompassing form of direct democracy; the vast majority of them establish 
representative government that incorporates regular elections. Therefore when 
constitutions proclaim ‘we the people’, in most instances they mean, ‘we the democratic 
voters’.  
Although the United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy, and the people hold 
significant power, it is also the case that the UK operates on the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty: that is, Parliament is the highest legal authority within the 
state, and parliamentary sovereignty is the underlying principle of the constitution.48 
This principle of Parliament being the highest state authority, as opposed to ‘the people’, 
has in itself led some to call for a written constitution.49 As the Commons Committee 
observed, ‘In a democracy the people, not Parliament, are sovereign…Parliamentary 
sovereignty is an anachronism in the democratic era, and needs replacing by a written 
constitution that expresses the sovereignty of the people and circumscribes the powers 
and duties of members of Parliament in both Houses’.50  But there are significant 
difficulties with claiming that the answer lies in a ‘we the people’ democratic 
constitution. I have previously argued that the notion of parliamentary sovereignty does 
not impede the notion of popular sovereignty; in fact, it likely complements and 
strengthens it.51 Additionally, many constitutions based around popular sovereignty 
provide ultimate authority to the courts (ie, unelected officials) to determine what is 
constitutional or unconstitutional in a given state, thus obscuring—even turning on its 
head—the very notion of ‘we the people’ foundations. 52  How such a prominent 
hypocritical feature of democratic constitutions continues to flourish speaks volumes 
about the duality of these contemporary documents, and perhaps even about 
contemporary democracies: ‘sovereign’ citizens seem willing, even keen, to accept 
significant constraints on their power. This insight is important for the empirical 
analysis and further discussion below.   
                                                        
48 For a historical perspective of parliamentary sovereignty, see AV Dicey, The Law of the Constitution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). For a contemporary perspective on parliamentary 
sovereignty, see M Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and 
Democracy (Oxford: Hart, 2015).  
49 Blackburn, above n 28. 
50 A New Magna Carta, above n 1. 
51 Jones, above n 12, at 85.    
52 LD Kramer, ‘We the Court’ (2001-2002) 115(4) Harvard Law Review 6.  
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 Some recent literature from a group of critical constitutionalists has cautioned 
against the downsides of constitutions and hinted at the possibility that they may be 
democracy-hindering (as opposed to democracy-reinforcing) mechanisms,53 or could 
mislead citizens into thinking that they are the definitive power-bearers in society.54 
Fascinating constitutional scholarship has emerged here, such as the exploitation of 
sham constitutions,55 the decline of the once venerated American Constitution56 and 
Bill of Rights,57 and even the argument that constitution-making often does poorly at 
incorporating the specific values some polities hold, therefore forming not ‘popular’, 
but ‘unpopular’, constitutionalism. 58  Scholars have even pointed to instances of 
‘unpopular sovereignty’ in particular constitutions.59 The constitution-making process 
itself has been increasingly exposed in recent years, identifying it as ‘politics by other 
means’.60 And in a cautionary note for countries thinking of penning new constitutions, 
scholars have found that the average national constitution only lasts 19 years before 
being replaced. 61  Nevertheless, while this chorus of critical constitutionalism is 
growing stronger, largely within constitutional scholarship the overall prospects for 
constitutions remain strong and the focus of most current scholarship is on their 
potential benefits.  
Much of the rhetoric on bills of rights speaks of legal empowerment, especially the 
power to take rights claims before the courts. And yet, further claims have been made 
in terms of citizen empowerment, sovereignty, and potential democratic effects. 
Aspirations have long been explicitly connected to rights; after all, the codification of 
human rights is ‘a movement which answers the aspirations of peoples and takes its 
origins from the aspirations of peoples’.62  Levinson asserts that when it comes to 
constitutional concerns about political structure, people ‘[t]oo often…tend to yawn at 
discussions of such issues’, and often ‘become animated only when discussion turns’ 
to rights, such as speech, religion or private property.63 Some have asserted an explicit 
                                                        
53 Versteeg, above n 37, p 1133.  
54 Galligan, above n 42, p 711.  
55 D Law and M Versteeg, ‘Sham Constitutions’ (2013) 101(4) California Law Review 863. 
56 D Law and M Versteeg, ‘The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution’ (2012) 87 New 
York University Law Review 762.  
57 J Allan and G Huscroft, ‘Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in 
American Courts’ (2006) 43 San Diego Law Review 1.  
58 Versteeg, above n 37. 
59 See, eg, CY Huang, ‘Unpopular Sovereignty: Constitutional Identity Through the Lens of the 
Sunflower and Umbrella Movements’ in BC Jones (ed), Law and Politics of the Taiwan Sunflower and 
Hong Kong Umbrella Movements (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), pp 117-126.  
60 R Hirschl, ‘The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions’, in Galligan and Versteeg, Social and 
Political Foundations of Constitutions (2013) p 157.   
61 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, above n 14, 129.   
62 J Cooper and A Marshall-Williams, Legislating for Human Rights: The Parliamentary Debates on 
the Human Rights Bill (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) p 11. 
63 Levinson, above n 13, p 152.  
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 connection between sovereignty and rights. Ackerman, for instance, notes that in 
America it ‘is the People who are the source of rights’.64  
Before the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 was adopted, a number of claims were 
made about what the legislation would accomplish. Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor at 
the time, noted that a ‘culture of awareness of human rights would develop in the UK’, 
and that domestic implementation of the Convention would give ‘credibility to our 
foreign policy’ and increase the UK’s international standing.65 Mike O’Brien, then 
Under-Secretary for the Home Office, noted that ‘the effects will be profound. The Bill 
will benefit individuals, Government and the whole of society’.66 Jack Straw, then 
Home Secretary, argued it would ‘strengthen representative and democratic 
government…The Bill will thus create a new and better relationship between the 
Government and the people’.67 Thus beyond the legal effects of the legislation, political 
claims were also key to selling it. Even before the emergence of the HRA, however, it 
was argued that bills of rights make better, more informed citizens. In proposing a UK 
Constitution, the Institute of Public Policy Research noted that the inclusion of a Bill 
of Rights might indeed have such effects on the citizenry:  
 
Learning about these principles would become part of the school curriculum 
and adult education, encouraging pupils and students to debate the importance 
of protecting human rights and the difficulties which arise when they conflict. 
Such a development would encourage a more informed public, more sensitive 
to the implications of restricting civil liberties and of extending them.68 
 
But such an idealistic argument appears woefully naive, and there is no empirical 
evidence that citizens of states incorporating a bill of rights are any more 
knowledgeable or informed than citizens of states without such devices. The symbolic 
elements of bills of rights have also been acknowledged, given that for ‘the great mass 
of people, the chief significance of a Bill of Rights is less a tool of legal litigation than 
as a symbolic political declaration of what their civil rights and freedoms are or should 
be’.69 Thus both constitutions and bills of rights have had a wide range of claims 
attached to them, and many such assertions suggest that democracies—one way or 
another—will be invigorated by such documents.  
                                                        
64 Ackerman, above n 46, p 15.  
65 J Cooper and A Marshall-Williams, Legislating for Human Rights: The Parliamentary Debates on 
the Human Rights Bill (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) p 1. 
66 Ibid, p 9.  
67 Ibid, p 3.  
68 Institute of Public Policy Research, A Written Constitution for the United Kingdom (London: 
Mansell, 1991) p 13.  
69 R Blackburn, Towards a Constitutional Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom (London: Pinter, 1999) 
p 40. 
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2. CONSTITUTIONS AND VOTER TURNOUT: A PROVISIONAL INQUIRY 
As seen above, many claims have been made about the value of constitutions and their 
effects on democracy, and it is not uncommon for constitutions to be suggestively 
connected with political participation in the manner that the Commons Report does: 
that a written, modern constitution would encourage participation in the political 
process. However the relationship between constitutions, bills of rights, and voting 
(which remains citizens’ most significant from of participation), deserves further 
investigation. After all, ‘constitutionalism without social science is an arid intellectual 
pastime’.70 
Powell’s pioneering work on democracies and voter turnout labelled electoral 
participation as one of the three indications regarding the performance of democratic 
states.71  And yet analysing voter turnout—and especially the reasons for electoral 
participation—has always been a complex endeavour. One article on the subject of 
voter turnout in democracies correctly noted that ‘few other areas of political science 
research have been as riddled with puzzles and paradoxes as the study of electoral 
participation’. 72  Research on voter turnout has long taken into consideration 
demographic factors (eg, level of education, socio-economic status, gender, race), but 
that is only part of the story. Powell and Jackman largely moved the discipline towards 
focusing on institutional variables when assessing electoral participation. 73  These 
institutional elements, such as compulsory voting, electoral systems, unicameralism, 
voting age and voting laws were long considered the dominant factors when assessing 
voter participation. 74  However recently scholars have noted that such institutional 
variables may be over-stated in the literature, arguing that ‘[i]nstitutions matter less 
than we are prone to believe’,75  and that ‘the impact of institutions on turnout is 
shaky’.76 
Voter turnout fluctuation is the primary aspect I will be examining below, and is 
further explained in the methods section. To put it mildly, this phenomenon is difficult 
to explain. Here researchers have found that voting has generally declined in 
                                                        
70 R Hardin, above n 25, p 52. 
71 GB Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984).  
72 M Gray and M Cual, ‘Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997: 
The Effects of Declining Group Mobilization’ (2000) 33(9) Comparative Political Studies 1091.  
73 GB Powell, ‘American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective’ (1986) 80(1) American Political 
Science Review 17; RW Jackman, ‘Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in industrial democracies’ 
(1987) 81 American Political Science Review 405.  
74 A Blais, ‘What Affects Voter Turnout’ (2006) Annual Review of Political Science 111.  
75 Ibid, p 121.  
76 Ibid, p 116. 
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 industrialised democracies in the post-war period, and that younger generations are not 
as interested and do not attach as much importance to politics as older generations.77 
That may explain long-term voting decline, and even some decline in the below case 
studies, but it does not explain significant voting fluctuations. One of the most 
prominent studies explaining voter fluctuation is that of the ‘swing voter’s curse’, in 
which Fedderson and Pesendorfer found that poorly informed voters sometimes 
rationally delegate their vote—through abstaining—to more informed voters.78 Such a 
delegation can at times produce a significant drop in voting turnout. However even if 
such a phenomenon as the ‘swing voter’s curse’ was impacting the data below in 
relation to newly enacted constitutions and bills of rights, this would be valuable 
information.  
It is not the purpose of this piece to make a moral argument for voting within 
democracies; that argument has been forcibly made elsewhere. 79  But the question 
remains: why study the connection between constitutions, bills of rights and voting? 
Although there may be connections between the performative and symbolic aspects of 
constitutions and democratic participation, traditionally such documents do not appear 
to have been analysed in terms of their impact on voter turnout (except in cases of 
expanding the franchise or opening/tightening voting rules or rights). Perhaps there may 
be good reason for the lack of enquiry: the creation of constitutions, bills of rights, and 
major constitutional amendments is a highly politicised endeavour that may put citizens 
off politics and the political process.80 As Hannah Pitkin once stated, ‘constitutions are 
made, not found’, and are almost always the result of ‘a political struggle’.81 This much 
is acknowledged. One only has to look at the contention that continues to revolve 
around the UK’s HRA 1998, which the Conservatives have repeatedly stated they 
would like to repeal,82 or the 2008 constitutional amendments in France, where merely 
                                                        
77 A Blais, E Gidengil, N Nevitte and R Nadeau, ‘Where does turnout decline come from?’ (2004) 43 
European Journal of Political Research 221, 229.  
78 TJ Fedderson and W Pesendorfer, ‘The Swing Voter’s Curse’ (1996) 86(3) The American Economic 
Review 408. 
79 A Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); A Blais, To Vote 
or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2000) pp 92-114.  
80 Versteeg, above n 37.  
81 H Pitkin, ‘The Idea of a Constitution’ (1987) 37 Journal of Legal Education 167, 168 (emphasis in 
original).   
82 Conservative Party, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for 
Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws’ (October 2014); A Asthana and R Mason, ‘UK must leave 
European convention on human rights, says Theresa May’, The Guardian (25 April 2016), at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on-human-
rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum (accessed 20 October 2017). The 2017 Conservative manifesto says 
they will consider the UK’s human rights framework ‘when the process of leaving the EU concludes’, 
at https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto (accessed 20 October 2017). 
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 one vote in the National Assembly pushed major reforms through, 83  to see that 
constitutional change is a delicate and at times volatile undertaking.  
And yet there remain good reasons studying this complex relationship now. Firstly, 
the prospects of the UK penning some form of written constitution, from a large-C 
Constitution to potentially a smaller statutory measure has recently been reviewed in 
Parliament,84 and remains an active concern for many.85 As the Commons Report states, 
perhaps the UK’s historic unwritten constitution is putting people off the political 
process. Although the Committee did not make any formal recommendations, the 
recent interest in penning a written constitution largely coincided with the 800th 
anniversary of the Magna Carta,86 and the prospect of a written constitution under any 
future government could easily be just around the corner.87 During the run-up to the 
2014 independence referendum, the Scottish Government published the Scottish 
Independence Bill, which—should Scotland have voted to leave—contained an interim 
Constitution and provisions for a permanent one.88 But perhaps more significantly, a 
plethora of complaints regarding the lack of a UK constitution have been made by 
citizens,89 the judiciary,90 the political establishment,91 academia92 and certainly by 
outsiders hoping to gain some operational knowledge of the UK constitution.93 Talk of 
constitutional crises, malaise, uncertainty and anomie within the UK has also arisen in 
recent years.94 Some of these complaints take the form of the UK not being an ‘evolved 
democracy’, or ‘living in the past’ because of the lack of a codified document. 
Nowadays constitutions are undeniably associated with modernity and innovation, 
                                                        
83 ‘France backs constitution reform’, BBC News (21 July 2008), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7517505.stm (accessed 20 October 2017).  
84 A New Magna Carta, above n 1. 
85 See, eg, A Barnett, ‘Why Britain needs a written constitution’ The Guardian (30 November 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/30/why-britain-needs-written-constitution 
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
86 Besides the Commons Report, see, A Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United 
Kingdom (Oxford: Hart, 2015).  
87 UCL’s Constitution Unit has recently provided the blueprint for a constitutional convention. 
Although they did not advocate that the body consider a written constitution, they do acknowledge that 
it may be an outcome of such events (A Renwick and R Hazell, Blueprint for a UK Constitutional 
Convention (June 2017), at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/images/news/ccblueprint-2  
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
88 Scottish Government, The Scottish Independence Bill: A Consultation on an Interim Constitution for 
Scotland (June 2014). 
89 L Colley, ‘Why Britain needs a written constitution’ Guardian (4 November 2011), at 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/nov/04/why-britain-needs-written-constitution (accessed 20 
October 2017).  
90 S Sedley, ‘No Ordinary Law’ (1998) 30(11) London Review of Books 20. 
91 See MP Graham Allen’s quest for a written constitution here: 
http://www.grahamallenmp.co.uk/campaigns/written_constitution (accessed 20 October 2017). 
92 LSE Constitution UK, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/constitutionuk/ (accessed 20 October 2017).  
93 G Witte, ‘After 800 years, Britain finally asks: Do we need a written constitution?’ Washington Post 
(7 June 2015), at http://wpo.st/5oEq1 (accessed 20 October 2017).  
94 EF Delaney, ‘Stability in Flexibility: A British Lens on Constitutional Success’, in Ginsburg and 
Huq, above n 11, p 394.  
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 while the lack of a constitution is associated with staleness or antiquity. Perhaps this 
allure of novelty and freshness is a significant reason that many citizens, politicians, 
and others within the UK would prefer a codified Constitution, as opposed to the status 
quo. 
If the above constitutional claims are legitimate, and citizens do serve as the ultimate 
source of power under a democratic constitution, then political participation by the 
citizenry is essential to keep a watchful and critical eye on government, and to ensure 
that the citizenry—as opposed to other state entities—remains sovereign. The act of 
voting not only protects the establishment of democratic constitutions and the operation 
of sovereignty, but also protects the fundamental rights inherent in such documents. 
This is also true for states that protect rights through constitutional statutes (eg, a vote 
for Labour in 2015 could have been an attempt to protect the HRA, given that the 
Conservative Manifesto pledged to repeal it). More importantly, constitutional 
democracies rely on voting to preserve any meaningful democratic system. Voting is 
‘strategic to the operation of the system as a whole’, and given its one of the very few 
activities that citizens do together, can be characterised as ‘the paradigmatic form of 
universal citizenship participation’.95 If voting does not occur or dips to unsustainable 
levels, then alas, democracy has died.96  Thus connecting voter turnout to constitutional 
contentment is a valuable—if underexplored—area of constitutional theory.   
The traditional or ‘intuitive’ argument regarding new (written) constitutions and 
voter turnout—which the Commons Committee Report undoubtedly used, and which 
some constitutional law scholars have insinuated—goes as follows: 
 
New Constitution  Citizen engagement/contentment  Increase in electoral participation 
  
The same argument also holds for new bills of rights, and given the post-war celebration 
of human (and other) rights throughout many democracies,97 this phenomenon may 
even perhaps be stronger. Such an argument would progress as follows:  
 
New Bill of Rights  Citizen engagement/contentment  Increase in electoral participation 
 
Surprisingly little research or discussion focuses on the idea of new constitutions 
and bills of rights and their potential effects on democratic participation. And yet, the 
connection between such fundamental documents and democratic participation seems 
tautological: a newly enacted democratic constitution or bill of rights should invigorate 
                                                        
95 B Ackerman, above n 46, pp 238-39 (emphasis in original).  
96 Ibid, p 236.  
97 See, generally, L Henkin, The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1981) pp 1-30.  
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 a democracy, thus leading to higher voting levels. In particular, for those states recently 
enacting such documents, a constitution should serve as a catalyst for democratic 
engagement and participation. This piece questions such logic, critiquing whether 
constitutions and bills of rights are always the democracy-reinforcing mechanisms 
many have made them out to be. My argument here is primary empirical, but contains 
implications for the normative arguments put forward earlier regarding written 
constitutions’ (potential) democratic effects. Many of the case studies presented below 
fail to support the claim that new constitutions and bills of rights increase citizen 
participation in the political process.  
 
3. METHODS 
To begin we should at least follow the inclination flowing from much of the 
constitutional scholarship: that newly enacted constitutions or bills of rights are 
democracy-reinforcing, and indeed can be invigorating or inspiring. If this logic is 
followed, two hypotheses can be put forward:  
 
Hypothesis No 1:  
Newly enacted constitutions  higher voter turnout (especially in the short term) 
 
Hypothesis No 2:  
Newly enacted bills of rights  higher voter turnout (especially in the short term) 
 
Sometimes, however, major constitutional amendments come into force that 
significantly alter a state’s constitution. Some of these may even incorporate a bill of 
rights or new powers of a supreme or constitutional court to strike down 
unconstitutional laws. The analysis below takes three examples into consideration: 
Canada’s Constitution Act 1982, the EU’s 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, and France’s 2008 
constitutional amendments. All of these examples either contained a bill of rights or 
strengthened citizen rights against the state. Given the high level of consensus that 
successful constitutional amendments usually require, a third hypothesis can be put 
forward:  
 
Hypothesis No 3:  
Major constitutional amendments  higher voter turnout (especially in the short term) 
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 The voting turnout data used below comes from the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).98  This organisation contains a ‘voter 
turnout’ database that goes back to 1945 for virtually all countries that provide such 
data. 99  I primarily used the Constitute Project website 100  for analysing when 
constitutions were implemented or when major constitutional revisions occurred. I have 
attempted to provide illustrative case study examples from countries that operate, or at 
least used to operate, on the ‘Westminster’ style of governance. However this was not 
always possible, and some examples outside Westminster style democracies provided 
valuable insight. In the major case studies I also wanted to present evidence from 
generally healthy or well-functioning democracies, rather than ones that have 
undertaken a fundamental political transition, as the former reflects what the situation 
would be if the UK were to pen a written constitution. 101  The case studies are 
supplemented by a thorough search regarding post-WWII constitutional 
implementation. This is especially true for section 4 below, which focuses on 
constitutions. The results of this search complement the case studies, and provide more 
information as regards each section. In determining the parameters of this search, 
countries with compulsory voting (eg, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil), or those that 
implemented compulsory voting into their new constitutions (eg, Turkey), were 
eliminated from the analysis. Further, countries that implemented their constitutions 
before the IDEA data becomes available, such as Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, and 
Japan were also eliminated from the analysis. Countries not in the IDEA database were 
excluded from examination. Therefore, in total, 72 countries were included in the 
analysis.102  
Unfortunately, the below analysis is unable to study the implementation of written 
constitutions, as opposed to just new constitutions. Although this may be an important 
distinction, as the UK could be moving from an unwritten to a written constitution—
not merely from one written constitution to the next—the availability of the data do not 
support such a project going forward. Also, there are good reasons to think that the 
distinction between the two are marginal or even insignificant; newly implemented 
constitutions, even in states that already had a written constitution, often require a high 
                                                        
98 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), at www.idea.int (accessed 20 
October 2017).  
99 IDEA Voting Turnout database, at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout (accessed 3 July 
2017).  
100 Constitute Project, at https://www.constituteproject.org/ (accessed 20 October 2017).  
101 Although it is acknowledged that some of the examples outside of the main case studies below have 
come from countries making a fundamental political transition.  
102 There were two cases (Montenegro and Venezuela) where after constitutional implementation, 
voting in the same election produced offsetting results, by increasing in parliamentary turnout but 
decreasing in presidential turnout, or vice versa. These countries were also excluded from the analysis, 
as the data cancels each other out.  
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 level of political support (either by an elite group of drafters or framers, or even at times 
by the citizens), in order to move forward. If this support is not present, then any 
constitution in question is unlikely to be adopted.  
In the data presented below, general election voting results were analysed before and 
directly after a constitution or bill of rights was passed in a given jurisdiction. This 
allowed me to analyse whether a new constitution or bill of rights may have had any 
immediate effect on the voting outcomes of the accompanying jurisdictions.103 The 
length of time between constitutional implementation and the next general election was 
also taken into consideration, as the shorter amount of time between these events, the 
better for my analysis. It is important to note that the claims made about constitutions 
from the Commons Committee—and more widely, the suggestive claims noted above 
by other scholars as regards potential effects—did not supply any empirical evidence 
for their backing. Thus I have attempted to provisionally test such claims using raw 
voting data, and without employing sophisticated statistical methods. I acknowledge 
that some may dismiss these methods, but as noted above, this piece is provisional in 
nature, and is primarily looking to challenge these constitutional claims that currently 
have no empirical backing.  
Although such positive claims about constitutions may sound logical and reasonable 
(eg, that constitutions would improve democratic participation or better educate 
citizens), as scholars we cannot rely on logic alone. After all, it was once believed that 
the world was flat, that the body was made of four humours, and that lobotomies were 
a viable method to treat mental illness and criminality. Perhaps in the near future 
scholars will be able to assemble a model that can isolate the impact of constitutions, 
bills of rights, or major constitutional amendments that may further expand on this 
study. I fully support, and even encourage, such a project. But the reality—as any 
scholar that has undertaken such research or has taken the time to learn or study 
statistics—is that in any such model there will be deficiencies and unknown variables 
that the model will be unable to capture, and we will be left arguing about what was in 
the models and how those variables were weighted, rather than the discussing the 
importance of the claims themselves. Voter turnout, after all, is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon that political scientists are still attempting to understand.104 
Nevertheless, the sections below provide provisional evidence that more research is 
needed in this important area of constitutional theory.  
 
                                                        
103 There may be a strong argument that one should look at the long-term effects of new constitutions 
and their effects on voting participation. While I do hope to eventually take this into consideration, a 
project of such magnitude is outside the scope of this paper.  
104 Gray and Cual, above n 72. 
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 4. NEW CONSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
A prominent example of how a new constitution could potentially affect voting is 
France’s 1958 constitution. The figure below displays French voter turnout from 1945 
to 1981, with the vertical red line marking the implementation of the constitution. 
 
   Figure 1. French Voter Turnout from 1945-1981.105 
 
The timeline for France’s 1958 Constitution was ideal for this study. The 1958 general 
elections were held on the 23rd and 30th November 1958, just six weeks after the 
adoption of the 1958 Constitution on 4 October 1958. Thus the elections were at least 
an indirect referendum on the 1958 Constitution. Given these circumstances, the results 
prima facie demonstrate that the populace was not on the whole more willing to 
participate in their democracy than they were in 1956, just two years before the Fifth 
Republic came into existence.  
Analysing statutory constitutional documents can also prove fruitful, as the UK 
government has considered not necessarily enacting a Constitution per se, but a 
constitutional statute.106 New Zealand represents an interesting test case as regards both 
a constitutional statute and, as we will see below, a statutory bill of rights. New 
Zealand’s Constitution Act 1986107 is similar to what some have proposed for the UK: 
                                                        
105 IDEA Voter Turnout Database, ‘France’, at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/86/40 
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
106 A New Magna Carta, above n 1. 
107 Constitution Act 1986, Public Act No 114 (13 December 1986). Crucially, this Act does not contain 
a ‘we the people’ clause, as many contemporary constitutions do. However, it does articulate the 
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 a small ‘c’ statutory constitutional statute108 that can be amended by another statute. But 
the Act, which came into force in 1987, did not appear to invigorate citizens or at least 
persuade them to go to the polls later that year, as voter turnout declined from 93.71 per 
cent in 1984 to 89.06 per cent in 1987. Although this is not a terribly significant 
decrease in voter turnout, it is nevertheless a decrease.    
 
   Figure 2. New Zealand voter turnout 1978-1999109  
   
Of course, the above are merely two examples. Other states that have introduced 
new constitutions have had similar, and at times dramatic, experiences as regards voting 
turnout. Colombia held parliamentary elections in 1990 that garnered a 55.33 per cent 
turnout.110 A year later a new Colombian Constitution came into existence on 4 July 
1991. Merely three months later, on 27 October 1991, parliamentary elections were 
held. Although it is acknowledged that citizens had just voted a year earlier and may 
have been ‘turned off’ politics, the 1991 turnout garnered Colombia’s lowest recorded 
voter turnout ever: 33.00 per cent.111 This was a dramatic, 22 percentage point drop 
from the previous year. A similar event occurred in Spain. After Francisco Franco died 
in 1975, Spain held a general election in 1977 that garnered a turnout of 76.96 per 
                                                        
structure of the state and further citizen understanding of their government.  
108 Some refer to these documents as ‘super-statutes’.  
109 IDEA Voter Turnout Database, ‘New Zealand’, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/234/40 
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
110 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘Colombia’, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/82/40  
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
111 Ibid. 
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 cent.112 In 1978 a draft Constitution was written, a constitutional referendum was held 
on 6 December 1978, and the formal Spanish Constitution was adopted on 27 December 
1978 by King Juan Carlos I. However just over two months after constitutional 
ratification, a general election was held on 1 March 1979, which produced a 68.13 per 
cent turnout. This was an almost nine percentage point decrease from the 1977 election, 
and has remained the lowest voter turnout since Spain’s post-Franco transition to 
democracy (the closest percentage to this came in the 2000 general election, which 
produced a 68.71 per cent turnout).113 These two prominent examples demonstrate 
provisional evidence that the implementation of new constitutions and their impact on 
voting must be further explored. In a thorough search of states that enacted new 
constitutions post-WWII, it was found that voting decreased after constitutional 
implementation in 44 countries. 114  Voter turnout was found to decline after 
implementation of constitutions in Albania (1998), Belize (1981), Croatia (1991), 
Hungary (2011), Malta (1964) and Poland (1997), among others. Further, the lowest 
post-WWII recorded vote phenomenon after constitutional implementation was found 
in 12 of those 44 countries, including: after Denmark’s 1953 Constitution (80.8 per 
cent); 115  Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution (60.35 per cent), 116  and the Central African 
Republic’s 2016 Constitution (44.28 per cent).117 These examples provide tentative 
evidence that Hypothesis No 1 can be refuted. 
Of course, this pattern does not always hold for newly implemented constitutions, 
and there are many instances in which voter turnout increased. In the same search noted 
above, post-WWII new constitutions were found to produce an increase in voter turnout 
in 28 countries, including in Barbados (1966), Jamaica (1962), Honduras (1982), 
Morocco (2011), Nigeria (1999), Paraguay (1992), Sweden (1974) and Switzerland 
(1999), among others. Findings regarding the opposite of the ‘lowest recorded vote’ 
phenomenon noted above—the ‘highest recorded vote phenomenon’—occurred in 10 
of the 28 states. Senegal is a prominent example of such an effect, as its voter turnout 
jumped from 39.28 per cent to 67.26 per cent after passage of its 2001 Constitution.118 
However, my argument is not that voter turnout always falls, and it is not within this 
                                                        
112 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘Spain’, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/103/40 
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
113 Ibid.  
114 Data available upon request. This number includes New Zealand, which passed a statutory 
constitutional document (Constitution Act 1986), but does not include the United Kingdom, which 
passed only a statutory bill of rights (Human Rights Act 1998).  
115 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘Denmark, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/94/40  
(accessed 20 October 2017).  
116 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘Tunisia’, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/284/40  
(accessed 20 October 2017). 
117 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘Central African Republic, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-
view/75/40 (accessed 20 October 2017). 
118 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘Senegal’, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/269/40 
(accessed 20 October 2017). 
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 study’s scope to analyse cases of voter increase; my job here is merely to demonstrate 
that constitutions do not always invigorate democracies.  
 
5. BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
This section will analyse Hypothesis No 2, that newly enacted bills of rights are likely 
to increase voter turnout. Although bills of rights are common in newly enacted 
constitutions, enactments on their own do not occur as frequently. Thus, there were 
fewer data to analyse as regards these documents. The section begins with a case study 
on the HRA 1998, and then moves to other examples.  
 
Case study: The Human Rights Act 1998 
Both when it was proposed119 and after its enactment, the HRA 1998 has predominantly 
been viewed as a ‘bill of rights’ for the United Kingdom, and to a large extent—both 
by the legal and political establishment—it has been treated as such.120 Although passed 
in 1998, the measure did not fully come into force until 2000. Given that there was a 
general election in 1997 and another in 2001, this supplies ideal evidence in terms of 
examining the potential effects on UK voter turnout both before the HRA and after its 
implementation.  
But such an analysis must be put into context. The general election in 1997 was a 
sweeping victory that brought into power Tony Blair and New Labour. The election was 
characterised as a case of low voter turnout, given that up to that point turnout was the 
lowest in the post-war period, at 71.46 per cent.121 However given the 1983 general 
election turnout (72.81 per cent), it could not have been too shocking. Even though no 
structural changes to the voting mechanisms in Britain had taken place (as there was in 
1970, when the voting age was changed from 21 to 18), 122  Labour was ‘widely 
anticipated’ to win the election.123 Thus the 1997 voting turnout figures, after almost 
two decades of Conservative leadership, were hardly surprising. 
 
   Figure 3. UK voter turnout from 1979-2015124 
                                                        
119 UK Parliament, ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ (October 1997), CM3782.  
120 See, e.g., A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
121 D Denver and G Hands, ‘Turnout’ (1997) Parliamentary Affairs 720; C Pattie and R Johnston, ‘A 
Low Turnout Landslide: Abstention at the British General Election of 1997’ (2001) 49 Political Studies 
286. 
122 Denver and Hands, above n 121, p 720.  
123 Pattie and Johnston, above n 121.  
124 IDEA Voter Turnout database, ‘United Kingdom’, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-
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The results of the 2001 election, just after the HRA 1998 fully came into force, were 
stunning: voter turnout dropped over 12 percentage points, from 71.46 per cent to 59.38 
per cent. The 2001 election was also marked by what was described as ‘voter apathy’ 
across the board (one academic termed it an ‘apathetic landslide’).125 But the election 
also made history: the turnout ‘was the lowest in a general election since universal adult 
franchise was established in Britain in the 1920s’.126 Indeed, the result remains the 
lowest turnout in UK post-war history. Purely socio-economic or demographic changes 
cannot explain the difference in turnout, as the 2001 vote was only four years after the 
previous one; and indeed, no significant voting mechanisms had changed. Thus, other 
factors must have influenced the figures. A significant finding from the British Election 
Study (BES) data was that the campaign failed to motivate potential voters and that 
many citizens were bored throughout.127 The 2001 Labour victory was not a foregone 
conclusion, however. Usually after major landslide elections, such as occurred in 1997, 
normality (ie, more competition) returns to the political sphere; in fact this had 
happened with every major Labour peak going back to 1929 (including those in 1945 
and 1966).128 Yet the 2001 general election broke the trend back to competition, thus 
maintaining Labour’s distinctive advantage over the Conservatives. Again, even though 
causal inferences cannot be directly connected to the HRA lowering voter turnout, the 
                                                        
view/137/40 (accessed 20 October 2017). It is acknowledged that in the 2017 general election, voting 
turnout did climb back to 68.7 per cent, although this remains below pre-HRA levels.  
125 P Norris, ‘Apathetic Landslide’ (2001) Parliamentary Affairs 565.  
126 P Whiteley, H. Clarke, D. Sanders and M. Stewart, ‘Turnout’ (2001) Parliamentary Affairs 775.  
127 Ibid, p 776.  
128 Norris, above n 125, p 565. 
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 results still call into question what effect, if any, the constitutional statute had on citizens’ 
motivation to vote.  
 
Other recent bills of rights 
To provide an example from a Westminster style government who also enacted a 
statutory bill of rights relatively recently, we return to New Zealand, where shortly after 
their 1986 constitutional statute, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was 
enacted. 129  Recall that after the 1986 Act was passed, turnout dropped over four 
percentage points. The 1990 Act was passed in August and came into force that 
September. The general election of 1990 was held on the 27 October 1990, and again 
there was a 4 per cent decrease in the voter turnout (from 89.06 per cent in 1987 to 
85.24 per cent in 1990). The intriguing element regarding both the 1987 vote (after the 
Constitution Act) and the 1990 vote is that the general elections were held relatively 
soon after each major constitutional statute was passed; yet after the passing of each 
super-statute, voting turnout dropped—again, not significantly, but a drop nevertheless. 
Thus, over a span of six years and two very significant constitutional statutes, New 
Zealand voter turnout dropped from the low-90s to the mid-80s, as can be seen in the 
figure below. 
 
Figure 4. New Zealand voter turnout 1978-1999  
 
Outside of Westminster style democracies, another recent example of a bill of rights 
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 coming into effect is the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms130 that 
was enacted in 1991 by what was known at the time as the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, preceded by Czechoslovakia, and which has subsequently become the Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic, respectively. The document continued to remain in force 
in both countries after their split in 1992. The 1991 bill of rights was modelled after the 
US Bill of Rights, but was a bit more expansive in some respects. The data demonstrates 
that there was a significant drop in voter turnout after the Charter was implemented, 
from 96.33 per cent in 1990 to 84.68 per cent in 1992.131 And while the 1990 figure was 
extremely high, and could be the result of the excitement regarding a newfound 
democracy, the 1992 figure of 84.68 per cent—just two years later—represents almost 
a 12 percentage point decrease in voter turnout; another tentative sign that bills of rights 
may not invigorate polities. Altogether, the case studies above provide provisional 
evidence that Hypothesis No 2 can be refuted.  
6. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
France’s 1958 Constitution mentioned above was subject to its most significant 
amendments in 2008, which some scholars say saved or continued the existence of the 
Fifth Republic.132 Details of the constitutional amendments included various changes 
regarding major French institutions. Boyron notes that the 2008 reforms achieved three 
major aims: increasing the powers of Parliament, strengthening judicial independence 
and bolstering the rights and status of citizens.133 Although these appear to be positive 
democratic changes, voters did not reply with enthusiasm after they were made. Voter 
turnout slipped over four percentage points, from 59.98 per cent to 55.40 per cent, 
which at the time was France’s lowest voter turnout in the post-war era; it has since 
dipped even further, to 42.64 per cent in the 2017 parliamentary election. 
 
Figure 5. French voter turnout 1993-2017134 
                                                        
130 This is found in the Czech Republic Constitution at Art 3 (‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Basic Freedoms forms part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic’). Conversely, the Charter 
is also found in the Slovak Republic Constitution, but was directly implemented into the document 
between Articles 5 through 54.  
131 Czech Republic/Slovakia IDEA Voter Turnout database, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-
view/91/40 (accessed 20 October 2017), { HYPERLINK "http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-
view/266/40" } (accessed 20 October 2017), respectively. The 1990 and 1992 voting turnout figures 
are the same for both the Czech and Slovak Republic, as they were still joined as a Federal Republic at 
the time. Before 1990 there is no voting turnout data for either country. 
132 See, e.g., S Boyron, ‘France’, in D Oliver and C Fusaro, How Constitutions Change: A Comparative 
Study (Oxford: Hart, 2013) pp 140-42.  
133 Ibid, p 141. 
134 France IDEA Voter Turnout database, above n 105. In the 2017 election, French voter turnout in 
relation to Parliament dipped to 42.64 per cent.  
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Breaking away from country-based analysis, a significant example of major 
constitutional amendments can be provided by examining a supra-national entity: the 
European Union (EU). Although some may object to a body such as the EU being 
included in this analysis, there is little doubt that it incentivises a form of European 
citizenship, and in some ways, such as through its rights operations and political 
structure, resembles a nation-state. Indeed, a wide variety of scholars have critically 
analysed the EU as nation-state—even before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect.135 
Here there are two major aspects to examine in terms of ‘constitutional’ amendments: 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The former—in essence a bill of rights for the EU—preceded the Lisbon Treaty, being 
created in October 2000 and ratified in December of that same year by the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. The Lisbon 
Treaty—in essence a ‘constitution’ for the EU—was introduced after the failure of the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.  
 
Figure 6. Total EU voter turnout (1994-2014)136 
                                                        
135 See, eg, JA Caproraso, ‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-
Modern?’ (1996) 34(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 29; S Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: 
Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the 
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
136 Eurostat voting data, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsdgo310&langua
ge=en (accessed 20 October 2017). Figures on voter registration and voter turnout are not available.  
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EU parliamentary elections are held every five years. When the EU held 
parliamentary elections in 1999, before ratification of the Charter, voting turnout was 
49.5 per cent.137 The next elections took place in 2004, and the result was lower voter 
turnout: 45.5 per cent. However at the time the Charter’s legal status was in question, 
as it had not yet been ratified by the EU member states. The time for ratification came 
in 2007, as the Charter was included as a significant part of the Treaty of Lisbon (ratified 
13 December 2007, but did not come into force until 1 December 2009). With the Treaty 
already passed and due to come into force, European parliamentary elections were held 
in June 2009. It was no secret that the Treaty was a significant issue throughout Europe. 
And yet, voting turnout dropped again in 2009 to 43 per cent, from 45.5 per cent in 
2004. Some may dispute the inferences to be drawn from using the 2009 elections to 
measure the significance of the Lisbon Treaty, as technically it had not yet come into 
force. If so, we can use the 2014 elections to measure potential success. Again electoral 
numbers dropped here, but only marginally, to 42.5 per cent, a .5 per cent decrease from 
2009. Altogether, it appears that the Charter, and more widely, the Lisbon Treaty, did 
not invigorate citizens and thus improve voter participation. These case studies provide 
tentative evidence that Hypothesis No 3 can be refuted.  
 
A positive impact on voter turnout? 
But of course all constitutional amendments do not result in lower voter turnout. An 
                                                        
137 Ibid.  
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 example of a significant constitutional amendment—which included a bill of rights—
that prima facie significantly aided voter turnout is from Canada: the Constitution Act 
1982. This is classified as a constitutional amendment because Canada’s constitution is 
a mix of written (31 statutes and orders) and unwritten principles, and there is no one 
controlling fundamental statute on which the Canadian constitution operates. 138 
Nevertheless the 1982 Act, which included the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,139 may have played a role in energising voters for at least a couple of election 
cycles. In particular, the 1980 vote, which occurred before the Charter was put in place, 
had a voter turnout of 69.32 per cent. Yet, as Table 7 points out below, in the 1984 and 
1988 elections, turnout increased to 75.34 per cent and 75.29 per cent, respectively.  
 
  Figure 7. Canadian voter turnout 1965-1997140 
 
The Canadian numbers require more explanation, however, as the situation is not as 
straightforward as the passage of a constitutional statute and bill of rights. The 1979 
election, which brought the Progressive Conservatives back into power with a minority 
government, was held less than nine months before the 1980 election. After the minority 
government was defeated in the Commons, a snap election was held in 1980, with the 
Liberal Party ascending to power. In 1982 the Canadian government received a form of 
‘patriation’ from Britain through the Canada Act 1982,141 which was part of a half-
century long process of negotiations between the two nations.142 Although Canada 
                                                        
138 T Kahana, ‘Canada’ in Oliver and Fusaro, How Constitutions Change (Oxford: Hart, 2013) p 11.  
139 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982.  
140 IDEA Voter Turnout Database, ‘Canada’, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/74/40 
(accessed 20 October 2017). 
141 Canada Act 1982 c. 11.  
142 Kahana, above n 138, p 26. 
Constitution 
Act 1982
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
1997199319881984198019791974197219681965
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 T
u
rn
o
u
t
Parliamentary Election Year
Canadian Voter Turnout: 1965-1997
27
 already had autonomous political independence from Britain, the 1982 Act thus 
completed the patriation of independence to Canadian citizens. The Act also entrenched 
civil rights within Canada’s supreme law, and gave the judiciary the power to strike 
down laws inconsistent with the Charter. 143  The passage of two significant 
constitutional statutes, which provided full patriation and the entrenchment of newly 
established rights, could have propelled Canadian citizens to turnout in higher numbers. 
In reality, however, the spike in voter turnout could be a distortion, as the low 1980 
voter turnout was probably due to the previous election being held just nine months 
before. Scholars have also noted that higher rates of women were running for election 
to parliament during the 1984 election,144 and that there was an ‘unprecedented’ change 
to media coverage of opinion polls that year,145 two factors that may have positively 
influenced voter turnout. However, regardless of whether we consider these factors, it 
is difficult to claim that the Charter ‘invigorated’ Canada’s democracy, as the 1984 
election merely brought election turnout close to where it was for the 1979 election.  
7. PLACATING, NOT INVIGORATING, DEMOCRACY 
The ‘traditional’ or ‘intuitive’ argument that constitutions and bills of rights invigorate 
democracy through enhanced political participation has been challenged. Raw 
empirical voting data from a number of prominent case studies, in addition to a 
thorough search of post-WWII constitutional implementation, has provided provisional 
evidence that the Commons Report’s overly simplistic understanding of the (perceived) 
effects of such devices does not hold, as in many cases voter participation decreased 
after implementation; thus, perhaps, placating—rather than invigorating—democracies. 
Therefore tendentious positive claims that constitutions and bills of rights can be 
inspiring, hold sacred value for citizens, and especially that they can ‘increase 
participation in the political process’ may need to be significantly re-evaluated and 
balanced with the recognition that such devices are not as powerful as previously 
thought.  
The reason that some jurisdictions have seen a drop in electoral turnout after 
implementation is unclear, and it would be irresponsible to attribute the decreases solely 
to the implementation of constitutions, bills of rights, or constitutional amendments. 
Voting turnout is a multifaceted phenomenon impacted by a number of complicated 
                                                        
143 Ibid, p 20. 
144 DT Studlar and RE Matland, ‘The Growth of Women's Representation in the Canadian House of 
Commons and the Election of 1984: A Reappraisal’ (1994) 27(1) Canadian Journal of Political Science 
53.  
145 RH Wagenberg, WC Soderlund, WI Romanow and ED Briggs, ‘Campaigns, Images and Polls: Mass 
Media Coverage of the 1984 Canadian Election’ (1988) 21(1) Canadian Journal of Political Science 
117, 126.  
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 factors (eg, interest in politics, perceived value of voting, political disenchantment). 
Nevertheless, the decreases found in many of the cases above cannot be ignored. 
Perhaps one explanation of such drops could be a reflection of what Pitkin and others 
have identified: that constitution making is a highly political process that involves 
intense power struggles.146 Such high-level political tussles could ultimately discourage 
democratic participation, rather than enhancing it. Additionally, a decrease in 
participation in some instances may be due to citizen placation or complacency: after 
the implementation of a constitution or bill of rights citizens may feel as if their states 
are in good working order, and thus feel less need to go to the polls. This could 
potentially explain the instances noted above—perhaps even after the HRA 1998—in 
which constitutional or bill of rights implementation produced the lowest post-WWII 
voter turnout levels.  
The issue of citizen sovereignty also needs to be addressed here. New constitutions 
and bills of rights are widely framed as ‘we the people’ documents that will increase 
citizen sovereignty. Given that the UK currently operates on a form of parliamentary 
sovereignty, the ‘we the people’ argument has been a common refrain in Britain for a 
codified constitution. But in reality the passage of contemporary constitutions and bills 
of rights often represent a significant curtailment of citizen power, as many of these 
newly established documents provide the judiciary—not the citizenry, or even 
representatives elected by the citizenry—ultimate powers to determine what is 
constitutional or unconstitutional within a state. Thus, are the decreases in political 
participation noted in the empirical section above an acknowledgement—and 
acceptance—by citizens that their power has been significantly curtailed? This could 
be another possible explanation for the decreases in democratic participation: citizens 
may recognise—or at least perceive—that their values and rights are now more 
entrenched, and being actively ‘protected’ by the judiciary. But given the prominent 
‘we the people’ framing of such documents that countries have repeatedly engaged in, 
this explanation seems unlikely. As Larry Alexander has noted, ‘the real question is 
whether the people are actually aware of what is going on’ in terms of how judicial 
review can amend a constitution.147 If citizens do realise how easily ‘we the people’ 
constitutions are amended by the judiciary, then ‘a constitutional crisis awaits’.148 
So, where are we in terms of constitutions being invigorating or placating democratic 
mechanisms? Above I have argued that if performative democratic constitutions, bills 
of rights and notions of ‘we the people’ popular sovereignty hold such high value within 
                                                        
146 Pitkin, above n 81. 
147 L Alexander, ‘What are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They Do?’, in Paul, Miller, and 
Paul, above n 13, p 23 (‘Is their acceptance itself dependent on their belief that the courts are not 
amending the constitution from the bench but are interpreting it?’). 
148 Ibid, p 23. 
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 democracies, then voting turnout is a realistic and justified measurement of 
constitutional contentment. And yet, in some cases after the enactment of new 
constitutions, bills of rights or major constitutional amendments—for whatever 
reason—states experienced a decline in voter turnout; such was the case in the UK after 
implementation of the HRA 1998, and the UK still has not climbed back to its pre-HRA 
voter turnout levels.149 This finding leads to the conclusion that while constitutions and 
bills of rights may serve larger goals as regards organising the state and entrenching 
fundamental rights, they could also contain democracy-hindering downsides—or, at the 
very least, may not be as politically powerful or inspiring as once thought. Whatever 
the implications of the above empirical data, there remains little doubt that more 
research is necessary into the connection between constitutions and democratic 
performance, such as voting. 
The consequences of such constitutional placation are important for democracy. The 
more that citizens feel a sense of placation or complacency about their constitutional 
settlements, two significant results may occur: 1) citizens will be less likely to be the 
watchful eye or critical voice that democratic states require; and 2) when citizens are 
less engaged with their democratic functions (ie, through voting), unelected actors 
within a state—such as the judiciary—become much more powerful, 150  thus 
diminishing citizen control. As citizens we must concede both the positives and 
negatives that constitutions and bills of rights offer. In many situations democracy may 
be placated, not invigorated, through the enactment of such texts. 
 
                                                        
149 In the 2017 snap election turnout did climb back to 68.7 per cent, the highest since 1997 (See BBC 
Election 2017 Results, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results (accessed 20 October 2017).   
150 For a classic account of the judiciary as an anti-majoritarian difficulty within democracies, see: A 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986); for a more contemporary account, see J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346.   
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